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Dear All, 
It was  a couple  of weeks  ago  that  I received 
an  email  from  a colleague  of mine who  was 
telling me about a controversial novel written 
by Sherry Jones on the Prophet Muhammed’s 
(SAV)  wife,  Aisha.  First,  I  thought  that  this 
was  just  another Islamophobic provocation. 
However,  after  conducting  some  more 
extensive  research on  the topic;  I decided to 
interview  Sherry  Jones  in  order  to 
understand  what  she  really  thinks  and 
bel ieves  about  Is lam.  Is  she  real ly 
Islamophobic?  Or  is  she  a  naïve  Westerner 
who is trying to promote herself by using the 
private  life  of  the  most  sacred  person  in 
Islam? Or  are  there  any political motivations 
behind  this  novel?  I  believe  that  we  as 
Muslims  –  either  by  culture  or  religion  ‐ 
should understand and differentiate between 
the Orientalist  framework which  is  based on 
the  imperialistic/racist  approach  similar  to 
what happened in the Danish cartoon crisis in 
the  name  of  free  speech;  with  people  who 
may  have  good  intentions  but  really  do  not 







Pakistani‐born  Kamran  Pasha’s  new  novel, 
Mother  of  the  Believers  will  be  released  in 
April  of 2009.  As  far  as  I know  Pasha’s new 
novel is not different than Sherry Jones’s The 
Jewel of Medina.  I wonder why some people 
are  suddenly  interested  in  studying  and 
writing about Prophet Muhammed’s personal 
life,  instead  of  writing  in  the  constructive 
framework. My intention is to understand the 
motives  behind  these  writings.  I  have  only 
questions,  no  answers,  but  answers  will  be 
provided by  the  author herself,  and you,  the 
readers will decide whether she is genuine or 
not. 
Peace and Salam  to you all,
Tugrul Keskin 
October, 2008 / Blacksburg, Virginia
VIRGINIA TECH  - Department of Sociology 560 McBryde Hall Blacksburg, VA 24061 - USA
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Interview with Sherry Jones 
on Her Novel “The Jewel of Medina” 
Islam and Free Speech
Tugrul Keskin: Thank  you for accepting this 
interview.  I  will  be  very  honest  and 
straightforward  with  you  in  this  interview. 
This  is  a  very  sensitive  issue  for  Muslims 
that you  have  broached,  in  trying  to  dig  up 
and  question  the  Prophet  Muhammed's 
(SAV)  private  life;  and  I  believe  that  as  a 
Muslim,  you  have  a  right  to  criticize  Islam 
and  Muslims,  however,  there  is  thin  line 
between  criticism  and  insult/racism,  like  in 
the case of the Danish cartoon crisis. Would 
you  please  tell  us  about  yourself  and  your 
recent novel, The Jewel of Medina? 
Sherry  Jones:  I  came  across  the  story  of 
A’isha  for  the  Qirst  time  shortly  after  the 
World  Trade  Center  attacks  in  2001.  As  a 
woman  and  a  feminist,  I  was  captivated  by 
her wit,  intelligence, and strength.  I began to 
read more about A’isha and her sister‐wives, 
and about Muhammad  and  the  revealing of 
Islam,  and  I  was  hooked.  My  goal  was  to 
bring these tales, already familiar to Muslims 
in  the  rest  of  the  world,  to  Western 
audiences.  I wanted to  honor A’isha and the 
other wives  by  bringing  them  to  life on  the 
page and allowing their voices to be heard in 
a historical  tradition that  largely  focuses on 
the men.
Tugrul  Keskin:  I  don't  think  that  many 
Westerners  understand  the  level  or  context 
of  certain  sensitivities  in  other  cultures. 
From my  perspective, many Westerners not 
only criticize, but also look down on Muslims 
and  demonize  Islam  in  the  name  of  free 
speech.  This is not  the way to  build bridges; 
it  is  the way  to destroy bridges.  Are you one 
of these people? Basically, why did you write 




tell  A’isha’s  story.  I  felt  called  to  her,  a 
spiritual  calling.  She  embodies  the  woman 
that I would  like  to  be:  smart,  strong,  witty, 
spiritual,  loving,  giving,  and  honest  with 
herself  about  her  Qlaws.  As  I  wrote  and 
researched, I developed a respect and regard 
for  the  Prophet  and  for  Islam.  At  the  same 
time,  I  regard  him  as  a  human  being,  a 
“mortal man,” as he  called himself.  He must 
have experienced the desires, hungers, fears, 
and  failings  that  we  all  struggle  with.  I 
believe  that,  by  bringing  those  qualities  to 
light,  we honor Muhammad as  a  being who 
transcended  his  Qlawed  humanity  by  the 
grace of God and so served as an example of 
what  is  possible  for  us  all,  if  we  seek  and 
strive as he did.
Tugrul  Keskin:  Today,  especially  after  9/11, 
many  people  call  themselves  an  expert  on 
Islam  and  Muslim  societies.  We  can  Qind 
these  people  in  Washington  DC  or 
universities,  or  at  think  tanks  as  just  a  few 
examples. Even in my university, people who 
have  never  been  in  any  Muslim  populated 
countries and don't speak any languages are 
called  ‘Middle  East  experts’  or  ‘experts  on 
Muslim societies and Islam.’ Of course, many 
of  these experts  use  books  on Islam  from a 
negative  viewpoint  to  "educate"  students. 
How much do you know about Islam and the 
Prophet's  Muhammed's  (SAV)  life?  Where 
did you learn this? What sources did you use 
for your book? 
Sherry  Jones:  I am  certainly no expert,  only 
an  interested  Westerner  who  is  always 
learning.  I  have  not  been  able  to  afford  to 
travel  to  Saudi  Arabia,  where  “The  Jewel  of 
Medina”  takes  place,  and  where  travel  has 
been so  restricted.  At any  rate, 14 centuries 
have  certainly  altered  the  culture  and  the 
landscape a great deal.  I did study two years 
of Arabic ‐‐ all that was offered at the time ‐‐ 
at  the University of Montana,  and  I  took  an 
Islamic  history  course  taught  by  Mehrdad 
Kia from Iran.
As  for  my  sources,  I  have  read  everything 
written  in  English  that  I  could  Qind.  My 
bibliography  comprises  some  30  books, 
including a four‐volume biography of the
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Prophet  by  Ibn  Kathir,  written  in  the  14th 
c e n t u r y ;  v a r i o u s  c o l l e c t i o n s  o f 
Hadith;“Women  in  Islam”  by  the  Moroccan 
scholar Fatima Mernissi; and “Muhammad: A 
Biography”  by  the  noted  Western  religious 
historian  Karen  Armstrong.  My  complete 






Sherry  Jones:  My  right  to  free  speech 
compasses my  right  to  artistic  expression.  In 
the United  States,  we  grow  up  learning  that 
the right  to  freedom of  speech,  thought,  and 
expression are as fundamental as the right to 
breathe and live. 
Tugrul  Keskin:  If  this  is  a  free  speech  issue, 
then why  did  the West  not  pay  attention  to 
Norman  Finkelstein  when  he  could  not  get 
tenure  at  DePauw  University,  or  Ward 
Churchill  who  was  Qired  from  the University 
of  Colorado  as  a  result  of  the  free  speech 
argument?  Do  you  think  that  free  speech  is 
used as  an excuse  to  insult  and discriminate 
against  people  and  cultures  who  are  not 
White/Christian/Western?
Sherry  Jones:  I  can’t  speak  to  these  cases, 
because I’m not familiar with them. However, 
I can tell you that our First Amendment rights 
are  always  being  debated  and  discussed  in 
this  country.  Schools  and  libraries,  publicly 
funded,  ban books because they  are deemed 
offensive,  and  people  protest.  Racists  make 
statements that offend certain groups; people 
write  books  that  offend  others.  But  we 
tolerate  these  hateful  forms  of  expression 
because,  if we  start  banning  one  form,  then 
where does it stop?
No  one wants to  live  in a totalitarian regime, 
where every word is monitored. 
Exceptions  would  be  forms  of  speech  that 
endanger  others,  such  as  death  threats,  and 
forms of expression that cause actual harm to 
others,  such as  child pornography.  These are 
considered  prosecutable  offenses  under  the 
law.
Tugrul  Keskin:  Do  you  think  Muslims  need 
another  Rudyard  Kipling's  the  White  Man's 
Burden in order to reform Islam? 
Sherry  Jones:  “Need”  is  not  the  issue here.  I 
didn’t  write  my  book  because  I  thought 
anyone  “needed”  it.  I wrote  it  because I was 
excited about  the  remarkable  A’isha bint  Abi 
Bakr  and I  thought others would like to read 
about her,  too.  However,  I do think  the world 
will  beneQit  from  learning  about  the 
egalitarian  underpinnings  of  Islam  and  the 
crucial role of women in forming the Umma.
Tugrul Keskin: Today, there are three types of 
people  who  study  Islam  in  the  Western 
Universities  and  Societies.  First,  Orientalists 
who  are  not  genuine  and  are  the  politically 
motivated  crusaders;  second,  Populists  who 
study  Islam  because  Islam  is  an  important 
subject to  specialize in,  in order  to  Qind a  job 
and niche for their careers;  third, people who 
study  Islam,  who  genuinely  want  to  learn 
about  Islam  and Muslim  Societies;  I  believe 
this  third  category  of  people  are  more 
objective  than  the  rest.  Where  do  you place 
yourself?
Sherry  Jones:  I’ll  bet  there  are  more  than 
three  kinds!  But  I  approached  my  research 
with  a  genuine  interest  in  learning  more. 
What I learned, I wanted to share with others. 
Of  course,  what  I’ve  written  is  just  MY 
interpretation  of what  I’ve  read.  It’s  not  the 
deQinitive  version  of  A’isha’s  life,  only  my 
vision of what her life could have been like.
Tugrul  Keskin:  On  September  30,  2005, 
Jyllands‐Posten  Newspaper  from  Denmark, 
published cartons of the Prophet Muhammed 
(SAV)  and  this  fueled  tensions  between 
Muslims  and West/Europe/US.  Do  you  think 
that this was  an honest mistake? Or was  the 
publishing of  these cartoons intentional with 
political  motivations  behind  it?  Most 
importantly,  how  do  you compare your  book 
with this incident?
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Sherry  Jones:  The  publishing  of  the  Danish 
cartoons was  another  exercise  of  freedom  of 
expression. The message was clear:  Islam has 
become perceived,  in  the Western world,  as  a 
religion  of  violence  and  destruction.  Those 
who  protested  with  violence  did  nothing  to 
change that perception.
My book  is  a book  of women’s empowerment 
that  also  attempts  to  promote  Western 
understanding  of a religion that  is  Qilled with 
misperceptions  in  the  States.  I  feel  uniquely 
situated  to  write  this  book,  and  its  sequel, 
because  I  held  those  same  erroneous  notions 
of Islam before I began my research.
Tugrul  Keskin:  Do  you  believe  Islam  is  a 
peaceful  religion or a religion of war as some 
Western conservative “crusaders” claim? 
Sherry  Jones:  Islam  in  its  pure  form  is  a 
religion  of peace,  in my  opinion.  Muhammad 
admonished Believers  to  Qight  in  self‐defense 
only,  and  he  practiced  that.  He  forgave  his 
enemies  ‐‐  even  those,  such  as  Abu  Sufyan’s 
wife, Hind,  who  didn’t  ask  for  it. He said,  “We 
are all  created from  the  same  soul.” You can’t 
get much more peaceful, and egalitarian, than 
that.  Unfortunately  for  moderate  Muslims, 
violent  extremists  within  the  faith  have 
created  a  negative  portrait  of  Islam  in  the 
Western  world.  Some  believe  that  Muslims 
want  to  conquer  and  rule  the  world  under 
Sharia law. I hope my book will help those who 
read  it  to  understand  the  true  Islam,  as 
Muhammad intended it.
Tugrul  Keskin:  Do  you  think  that  the  current 
US  foreign  policy  toward  Islam  and  Muslim 
Societies are based on an imperialist agenda?    
Sherry Jones: Yes, I do. And it is a real tragedy. 
The  United  States  is  now  perceived  ‐‐  a 
misperception  based  on  the  actions  of  our 
government  ‐‐  as  a  bully. Most people I  know 
don’t agree with our foreign policy concerning 
the  Middle  East.  I’ve  participated  in  several 
protests and vigils  for peace,  and I hold great 
hope  that  a new  president  will  bring  change. 
Killing  only  begets  killing,  and  produces 
nothing but hatred and fear. I want the U.S. out 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. I want us to reject this 
culture  of  fear  imposed  upon  us  both  by 
violent  religious  fanatics  and  our  own 
government. I wish for us all courageous lives.
Sherry Jones: A journalist for 28 years, Sherry 
Jones  has  worked  as  a  staff  reporter  for 
newspapers  in  suburban  Philadelphia,  North 
Carolina,  and Montana,  and  has  published  in 
numerous  magazines  including  Newsweek, 
Southwest  Art,  CMJ,  American  Cowboy,  and 
Rider.  She  is  a  freelance  correspondent  for 




About  the  Novel:  "The  Jewel  of  Medina"  by 
Sherry Jones is a historical novel about the life 
of  A'isha  bint  Abi  Bakr,  the  youngest,  and 
favorite,  wife of  the  Prophet Muhammad.  Set 
in  7th‐century  Saudi  Arabia,  it  details  the 
founding  of  Islam,  complete with  battles  and 




Dear Mideast sociologists and fellow-
travelers,
I hope that you will join me for an informal 
get-together at the Middle East Studies 
Association conference at 3 p.m., Monday, 
November 24, 2008. We will meet at the 
lobby of the conference hotel and, depending 
on our numbers, grab refreshments at the 
hotel cafe or a nearby eatery while learning 
about each others' research and concocting 
potential collaborations.
I realize that some of you have sessions at 





CB#3210, 155 Hamilton Hall
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
Phone: (1) (919) 962-1241




The Strange Case of the UIJ, or the 
evolutions of Uzbek Jihadism
Didier Chaudet
The French Institute of International Relations
didier.chaudet@gmail.com
 Historically, Uzbek Salafism is, to some 
extent, unique in Central Asia. It  is the only  one 
in the area that  has stayed strongly revolutionary, 
uncompromising, and prone to violence from its 
beginning in the Ferghana Valley at the 
beginning of the 1990s to its new safe heaven in 
Wazir is tan, Pakistan. Like their Taj ik 
counterparts, they  had the desire to conquer 
power, but contrary  to them, their path made 
them go further and further from the Islamist 
mainstream to an “al qaedan” way of thinking. 
Its final result is the Islamic Jihad Union. This 
group is probably not very important in terms of 
numbers, but it can organize itself from Greater 
Central Asia to Europe, and it sees its fight as an 
international one. Such an evolution makes it  a 
potential global security threat in the future. How 
come a local islamist fight in Central Asia can 
evolve in such an “unnatural” way?
 The Islamist situation in Uzbekistan was 
no different from the one in Tajikistan after the 
independence. Groups like Islam Lashkarlari 
(Warriors Of Islam) and its military wing Adolat 
(Justice) wanted to create an Islamic state, 
something that meant nothing else than a state 
able to deal with the post-Soviet situation. 
Indeed, the people in Uzbekistan lost a lot with 
the fall of the Soviet Union: free medical 
services, free education, and more importantly, 
control of the prices of primary goods. They saw 
mafia getting stronger, being able to challenge 
the state, and the society becoming more and 
more unequal and unsecured. But from 1992, the 
path of Tajik and Uzbek Islamists went in very 
different paths: during this year already, Islam 
Karimov had been able to reaffirm its power and 
to strike hard against any kind of opposition. 
Tajik official power has not been that strong, and 
the country  fell into civil war. So from the 
beginning of the 1990s, for the outside world, 
Uzbekistan looked like an example of stability in 
Central Asia. But nothing could have been 
further from the truth. 
 In fact, the 1990s were the time of an 
extreme radicalisation of Uzbek Salafism. First, 
one can easily make the case, through the actions 
of Adolat, that the Uzbek movement was already 
prone to violence. But once in exile, the Islamists 
could not get the peace of the defeated. Indeed, 
the Uzbek regime continued its fight regionally 
against its opposition, sending secret services to 
target Islamist and non-Islamist enemies of the 
state. The regime was only beginning to stabilize 
itself, and the fear of a Tajik fate made Tashkent 
choose drastic methods to avoid destabilization. 
As explained by Islam Karimov himself in July 
1992: “It is necessary to straighten out the brains 
of one hundred people in order to save the lives 
of thousands”. It meant, by the end of the 1990s, 
a strong repression against the religious and 
independent part of the population, without 
distinction between simple believers and possible 
suspects. Such politics reinforce tensions inside 
the country, making it easier for the Islamists in 
exile to organize sleeper cells. Outside 
Uzbekistan they clearly positioned themselves as 
struggling in a regional, and not only national, 
war, fighting the Tajik government with the local 
IRP (Islamic Revival Party). They  clearly 
appeared as hardliners, refusing the inter-Tajik 
peace in 1997. They also opposed their allies on 
nationalism: the Tajik Islamists were in favor of 
the Afghan Tajik Ahmad Shah Masoud, when the 
Uzbeks, on purely ideological ground, preferred 
to support the Taliban. Those divergences 
explain the formal birth of the IMU (Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan) in 1996. From 1999 to 
2001, this group has been able to put pressure on 
all the countries surrounding the Ferghana 
Valley. Indeed, its military commander, Juma 
Namangani, was able to use the Tajik part  of the 
Valley, and the Afghan Emirate of the Taliban, as 
his bases, and to strike forcefully in Kyrgyzstan 
and in Uzbekistan. He was also able to play  those 
three Central Asian countries against one another 
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through his military  actions, making them 
distrust one another, and pushing Tashkent to 
extreme reactions, this time against its 
neighbours. For example, Islam Karimov did 
not hesitate to order the bombings of Kyrgyz 
territory, or to mine the Uzbek borders with 
those two countries. During this period, 
Namangani has been able to organize effective 
sleeper cells, in Kyrgyzstan in particular, as well 
as to continue to use rug trafficking in order to 
finance his war against the Uzbek regime. 
 Without  the American campaign against 
Afghanistan by  the end of 2001, this is very 
possible to imagine a Central Asian region being 
more and more disrupted by the consequences 
of IMU’s military actions. The loss of the 
Afghan safe heaven has clearly been a terrible 
blow for the IMU: Juma Namangani died in 
Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban, the 
organization lost its training camps, and the 
other leader of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, has 
not been able to keep  the group united. 
Numerous fighters decided to abandon the 
movement at that time. This is interesting to 
note that those who did so disapprove the focus 
on other targets than the “Near Enemy”, i.e. the 
Uzbek regime. They did not see the fight for the 
Taliban, or against others than Islam Karimov, 
as relevant. It means that the ones who kept 
their affiliation, and their desire to fight, were 
much closer of the al qaedan vision of a total 
war against  the Near and the Far Enemy. In his 
speeches, Tahir Yuldashev still tried to keep a 
balance between those interested in a concrete 
fight against the post-Soviet Central Asian 
regimes of the Ferghana Valley, and those who 
saw the war in much broader terms. 
 Some in the la t ter group grew 
disillusioned with this approach and decided to 
split from the original movement. They formed 
together the Islamic Jihad Union, or Islamic 
Jihad Group, in 2002. If numerous Islamist 
groups in Central Asia seem to exist only on 
paper and in the head of the members of Uzbek 
secret services, this one is very real. It  appears 
that this group  has been responsible of the first 
suicide bombings in Central Asia (March-April 
2004), and the first attacks against the Far 
Enemy in the area, i.e. the US and Israel 
(suicide attacks against the embassies, June 
2004). It has to be connected with suicide 
bombings of Uzbeks against the Coalition in 
Afghanistan, expressing a deeper involvement 
against the Far Enemy than ever before. The 
choice of this new group to see the war in a 
broader sense was proved again in November 
2006, when an IJU plot failed, this time in 
Islamabad, with Pakistani recruits, who tried to 
attack government buildings. Last, but not least, 
September 2007 saw the discovery  of IJU 
sleeper cells in Germany, recruiting German-
Turks and German converts in order to strike 
this European ally of the US in the war for 
Afghanistan. At the same period, the group 
engaged itself in an intense propaganda 
campaign on Turkish Islamist sites in order to 
make it better known. The leadership is still 
Uzbek, but it is now clear that the IJU became a 
kind of Turkic Al Qaeda: clearly internationalist 
in its vision, its first goal is a revival of the 
Afghan Emirate of mullah Omar. Such a 
situation is particularly disturbing, as it is a 
proof that local politics in Greater Central Asia, 
and the support received for them from the 
Great Powers made such a radicalisation  
possible. 
Didier Chaudet is a Research Fellow at IFRI 
(The French Institute of International Relations 
– IFRI is one of the main think tanks in the 
European Union). He is a Lecturer at the 
Institute of Political Studies in Paris (Sciences 
Po Paris) on Security  in Greater Central Asia 
(Post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan). He was a Fox Fellow at Yale 
University
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'Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan: A 
Postcolonial Perspective'
Reed Taylor




 This article is a summary of a study  that 
began from a research project on Hizb ut Tahrir 
(HT) in Indonesia, where I sought to explain the 
appeal of the organization using a post-colonial 
approach. While I was doing research on this 
organization through Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia 
(HIT) website, I came across an article on the 
plight of HT members in Uzbekistan and how 
important it was for HTI to support its fellow 
members. This is interesting because most 
Indonesians do not know where Uzbekistan is, 
or feel a connection to the people in Uzbekistan 
because of its Muslim population. In contrast, 
HTI has disseminated several articles on the 
importance of solidarity between Indonesian 
members and Uzbekistan members. And from 
this, I began to question a common assertion 
that HT is a relatively disconnected political 
movement based primarily  on regional and 
national borders. Instead, I propose that as a 
pan-Islamic movement, HT should be 
understood as a group whose members see 
themselves as belonging to an identity that 
crosses regional and national boundaries. 
Therefore, I argue that the post-colonial 
approach that I have used in the case of Hizb ut 
Tahrir Indonesia can also shed some light, at 
least in part, on the case of Hizb ut Tahrir 
Uzbekistan.
 Currently, HT in Uzbekistan is explained 
in terms of a clash of civilization model, or in 
terms of a resurgent Marxist-Leninist model. I 
argue that both of these theories are antagonistic 
and coming from Eurocentric perspectives. An 
alternative is to consider the postcolonial 
condition that, I would argue, has had a much 
larger influence on the formation of HT and its 
appeal in a postcolonial context. Beyond 
explaining the development and structure of HT, 
postcolonial theory points towards a reification 
of a neo-colonialist mentality  by internalizing 
and negating a hybridized identity between the 
colonizer and the colonized. If one agrees with 
the thesis proposed in this paper, it can be 
argued that there is another threat of 
neocolonialism that emerges from within. We 
should consider changing our discourse to focus 
on the postcolonial conditions of HT in 
Uzbekistan and less on the call for an authentic 
Islamic identity.
 Hizb ut-Tahrir is a modern political 
Islamic movement that aims at establishing a 
global Islamic state that is meant to subvert the 
current postcolonial conditions in predominantly 
Muslim regions of the world. Hizb ut-Tahrir 
does not want  to work from within the current 
political arrangements to establish political and 
social change; instead it  is trying to form a 
viable alternative in the form of a transnational 
state. What is not being overtly stated in Hizb 
ut-Tahrir’s writings is the underlying connection 
between the colonized psyche and mimicry of 
the colonizer as an attempt to reverse the pre-
determined roles that are being questioned in 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology (Bhabha, 1994).
 A postcolonial critique offers several 
advantages over approaching Hizb ut-Tahrir 
from the perspective of a ‘Clash of Civilizations
with the West.It has been customary to refer to 
an impending battle between civilizations in the 
discussions of Hizb ut-Tahrir and even within 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s own discourse presented on 
online on their websites and in their texts (Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, 1998, 1999, 2001, n.d.). However, if 
we consider the historical development of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir’s ideology and if we reconsider their 
texts form a postcolonial critique, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
no longer embodies a homogenous Islamic 
culture that is purportedly antagonistic to a 
modern Western culture. Instead of creating a 
divide between Islamic populations and Western
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countries, a postcolonial critique is applied to 
destabilize and decenter these fixed borders to 
move beyond a reification of colonialism. By 
appealing to Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial 
discourse, the emphasis is placed on identity 
formation and the violent effects on the psyche 
for both the colonized and colonizer. It is the 
decentering of these binaries within colonialism 
of the Self/Other, black/white, core/periphery, 
etc. that creates the foundation for postcolonial 
movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
 In Hizb ut-Tahrir’s writings, there are 
several important concepts that have been 
appropriated from modern political Islamists 
discussed above that are used to justify a global 
Islamic state. The most important concept is 
Khalifa, which is used by Hizb ut-Tahrir to 
appeal to the nostalgia of a return to the time of 
the first four Caliphs as way to remove the 
contemporary  Muslim from the coercive powers 
of secularism, democracy, and capitalism. In 
addition to Khalifa, Hizb ut-Tahrir appropriates 
several other terms in making their argument for 
a global Islamic state, including the concepts of 
ummah, kuffar, and ijtihad; each corresponding 
to a wider discourse of anti-democracy, anti-
human r ights , and ant i - individual ism 
respectively. Through the use of each of these 
terms, I argue that  Hizb ut-Tahrir is reacting to 
the colonial model rather than attempting to 
return to a more egalitarian and pious past. 
 In Homi Bhabha’s (1994) The Location 
of Culture, Bhabha wrote that the identity of 
someone colonized is not simply defined by 
being marked as other to the colonizer, but it is a 
decentering of the ‘I’ as the intervening space of 
the Other as an enunciation that is inscribing the 
colonizer’s Self. Hybridity for Bhabha can only 
occur in this ‘in-between’ state of fluidity, where 
antagonistic binaries of self/other, black/white, 
core/periphery, etc. are being rearticulated as, 
“neither the One … nor the Other … but 
something else besides” ((Bhabha, p. 41). It is in 
this Third Space that the lens of the Self and 
Other are dissolved and a transformative process 
of hybridity takes place. What should be 
becoming clear is that hybridity is not the 
replacing of one cultural language for another 
and it  is not simply  the incorporation of one 
cultural language into another; it is the 
negotiation between interconnected cultural 
languages with drastically different relations to 
power. However, power is not clearly defined; it 
is distorted such that the colonizer/colonized are 
both trapped by having to define themselves 
based on the interstices of the Other, neither 
escapes unharmed (Bhabha, p. 153-154). 
 Another important concept found in 
Bhabha that is an aspect of cultural hybridity is 
mimicry. Part of the structure of colonialism is 
that a segment of the colonized population is 
needed to act as a middleman between the 
colonizer/colonized; they are required to mimic 
the colonizer by copying his language, customs, 
and dispositions. From the colonizer ’s 
perspective, it is not enough to simply dress and 
act like him; they must hold the same values and 
appreciate the world as he does. However, this 
can never be an exact replica of one cultural 
language for another because of the 
ambivalence and power inequalities of the 
interaction. For the colonized, mimicry is a 
further depersonalization and suppression of the 
‘I’ in identity because it only validates the 
colonizer’s Self and leaves the colonized with 
an empty  shell of the Other that is only  visible 
through the colonizer’s eyes. 
 Bhabha’s discussion centers on the 
ongoing legacy  of colonialism that continues to 
have a profound effect on the formation of a 
contemporary  Muslim identity. He prescribes a 
renewal of a historically informed cultural 
identity  that can potentially  overcome the 
legacies of colonialism. However, Hizb ut-
Tahrir rejects a negotiation between cultural 
languages and calls for an outright égation of 
Western culture, in a similar vein to the 
colonialist model that  Hizb ut-Tahrir is trying to 
overcome. The basis for this application is a 
desire to form a uniquely non-Western Islamic 
identity ; however, such an identity cannot 
ignore the mental and material reality  of the 
postcoloniality within the égatio. Instead, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir ends up reversing the ‘I’ from Other to
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Self without escaping the fundamental 
dynamic that égationes this colonialist model. 
It is due to this lack of negotiation that Hizb 
ut-Tahrir is unable move beyond colonialism. 
The problem is that by not negotiating 
between a contemporary Muslim identity and 
a Western hegemonic cultural identity, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir is re-inscribing through mimicry the 
current postcolonial arrangements but in the 
éga of colonizer through the revival of a 
‘pure’ Islamic cultural identity (Bhabha, 
122-126). It is in this blurred copy of 
colonialism that Hizb ut-Tahrir has positioned 
itself.
 In contrast to this postcolonial critique, 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is generally presented as being 
a radical political Islamic movement in 
accordance with a traditional Islamic culture 
that clashes against a modern Western culture 
or, if read literally, as a political Islamic 
movement that advocates a return to the past 
glory of Islam through establishing a 
transnational Caliphate. The essential problem 
with both of égat readings of Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
that they emphasize divergence without 
leaving room for a Third Space of enunciation 
(Bhabha, 56). Hizb ut-Tahrir is best viewed as 
a égation of Western hegemonic culture from 
within, instead of an external culture that is 
distinct and antagonistic towards the West. 
Based on the above postcolonial positioning of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, it can be argued that 
they are neo-colonialists in the making. 
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 Capitalist system has always been 
tagged with inherent financial fragility and 
business cycles. The recent credit crisis has 
made many staunch supporters of free market 
mechanism think to question its efficient 
working without active state supervision and 
intervention. For socialist  comrades what 
happened in the last few months is quite natural 
and it was supposed to happen. For Islamists, 
Muslim economists and activists of Islamic 
political, this is the begining of  the fall of 
capitalist economic system and replacing it with 
an Islamic financial system which is interest-
free, more stable and socially responsible. In 
this brief essay questions such as : does the idea 
of Islamic bank offers a panacea to the current 
crisis? Is there such thing as interest-free 
banking system free of all inherent fragilities 
deemed to be the hallmark of the interest-based 
financial system? How and to what extent the 
operations of Islamic banking have retained the 
ideals of offering interest-free arrangements in 
its actual practice?    
 Of all the capitalist institutions the only 
one that has posed itself as the most intimidating 
challenge to the Muslim thinkers is the modern 
institution of banking. To  scuffle this specter, 
an army of Islamic scholars, intellectuals and 
Muslim economists have set out to model the 
idea of an Islamic alternative i.e., Islamic 
banking. Enormous energies have been put in 
this direction in the last  four decades. A number 
of theoretical models of Islamic banking have 
been proposed in the literature and applied in 
practice. A number of enterprising individuals 
and states have tried to implement these models 
and produce a model of Islamic banking system. 
Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Sudan 
and Malaysia are to name a few such states. 
Several academic institutions were established 
such as the International Institute of Islamic 
Economics (IIIE) in Islamabad and Islamic 
Research and Training Institute (IRTI) at  IDB 
Jeddah to offer courses and degree programs, to 
teach and research and train individuals for 
Islamic banking operations. Such academic 
pursuits were co-supported by an active media 
campaign run by different Islamic banks and 
Islamic institutions to publicize and promote the 
institutions of Islamic banking. In Pakistan a 
number of electronic channels broadcasted 
sponsored programs on Islamic banking and its 
Shariah-compliant products. Most of the 
research conducted in the area of Islamic 
economics was conducted on different aspects 
of Islamic financial system with less focus on 
other areas such as poverty alleviation and 
distribution issues. This issue of research-bias is 
beautifully explained by scholars such as 
Taimur Kurn and Izzuddin Pal in their seminal 
works on Islamic economics. 
 Claims of Muslim economists and 
Islamic banks are mounting. They claim for 
multi-billion dollars deposits and financing with 
a higher rate of return on deposits. The rate of 
return is legitimized on the basis of the element 
of risk and thus its variability. The growth and 
expansion of Islamic banks worldwide is also 
shown to be tremendous. Its popularity and is 
claimed to be not only among the Muslim 
countries but also in Europe and the USA. 
Claims are also made that non-Muslim countries 
also desire Islamic banking branches and 
Islamic windows. Although, less effort has been 
made to enquire why this desire is common 
among the non-Muslim countries? Is it the 
quality of Islamic banking and novelty  of its 
products over the interest-based commercial 
banks or the underlying motivation for attracting 
more savings of the Muslim communities?
 Islamic banks offer a number of so-
called Islamic modes of financing. There are 
modes of financing such as Modaraba and 
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Musharaka which are considered at the core of 
the Shariah as permissible and interest-free 
among all the scholars. And there are other tools 
such as Murabaha etc which are found to be on 
the margins of the Shariah-complacency. 
History of Islamic banking practice reveal that 
an initial moving passion was shown for the 
former tools and less for the latter one. But later 
this composition changed and more enthusiasm 
was shown for the relatively risk-free modes 
and less for the other tools. Although, the former 
had more risk involved but close to Shariah in 
letter and spirit. What happened that in actual 
practice the true banking instincts (no risk, more 
profit) prevailed over this altruistic passion and 
the operations switched to tools such as 
Murabaha etc. There are also empirical 
evidences of how the profit motive has 
compelled the Islamic banking practice to 
provide more resources to trading than to more 
productive sectors such as agriculture and 
industry.                    
 All Muslim economists do not fully  
endorse the current practice of Islamic banking. 
Within the ranks of Muslim economists, a 
number of dissidents can be found. They are on 
the margins and often less heard but these are 
voices to be voiced. Some have serious 
reservations over the very notion of the idea and 
current practice of Islamic banking system. One 
such renown scholar when asked about the 
current status of Islamic bank was reported to 
have responded as … « if the possibility  of an 
Islamic prostitution can exist then an Islamic + 
Bank might be sellable…  what is supposed to 
be the ideals of the Islamic banks are in contrast 
to the very instincts of the banking industry. 
Banks are not supposed to be risking itself and 
its customers nor deemed to be working for 
alleviation of poverty. If they  have to be, then 
they  will convert to another form and will cease 
to be known as banks. Banks are not NGOs, nor 
welfare organizations. Banks are institutions for 
earning profits through lending and borrowing 
without risking its loans and profit and the 
capital of its customers. » (face to face interview 
2005)      
 Some  basic theoretical work is done by 
Ghamidi (2008) and his students to promote the 
concept that all institutions of capital formation 
and its management be under the control of the 
publ ic sector. The model proposes a 
dichotomous arrangement where financial 
management should completely come under the 
control of the state and the real sector 
comprising by  industry, agriculture and trade be 
given in the private hands. Ghamidi’s assertion 
is that it doesn’t matter how much effort  is done 
to eliminate interest from the banking 
transactions it will re-enter through backdoor 
and will hamper all such efforts of eliminating 
interest from financial transactions. This idea 
couldn’t  gain currency among the populist 
Muslim economists and corporate-Ulama. 
 Ove rwhe lming ma jo r i t y o f t he 
contributors to the theoretical models are those 
who were trained in the Western new-classical 
tradition of economics. And since these modern 
educated economists were  Muslims too, they 
came up with banking models with a patchwork 
of Islamic tools engineered by  traditional 
Ulama. The so-called Islamic tools were re-
energized by  traditional Ulama from Fiqh 
literature. These were Arabic names for different 
transactions now baptized as corpus of holy 
words which can never be disagreed. These 
Arabic names were labeled, packaged and 
marketed as if these were revealed as alternative 
Islamic tools to the modern tools of commercial 
banking. The social construction of non-Arab 
Muslim societies is that they surrender to any 
such names and labels that sounds in Arabic. All 
such names would be respected, blindly 
followed and never put to criticism. It happened 
that interest is being sold to Muslims under the 
beautiful packaging of these Arabic titles called 
Islamic modes of financing.
 The Muslim scholarship is engaged in a 
fierce battle with the elimination of interest 
from transactions. Less attention is paid to the 
idea of engaging with the institution that propels 
interest i.e., modern banking industry. In reality, 
the problem is not with the interest/usury/riba
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with the very  institution of banking that is 
dependent on interest for its survival. Imagining 
bank without interest is to conceive a Muslim 
without Ieeman (belief/faith). If Islamic 
economics and the so-called Muslim economists 
have to contribute something new and original 
to the capitalist world then they should come up 
with an original alternative ofthe modern 
banking system. After reading and reading on 
Islamic banking system and Islamic economics, 
I can very  safely  say that the model of Islamic 
banking is nothing but a blend of the modern 
financial tools with a patchwork of Arabic 
vocabulary presented as Islamic financial 
modes.
 Whenever there is a financial crisis or a 
move towards Islamization of economy, the idea 
of Islamic economics and Islamic banking 
system is presented such as if it is a new 
discovery  or an amazing exploration. The fact of 
the matter is that it has lost all its potential, its 
originality and vitality very  soon after it came 
into existence.  
 We look fo rward to a Mus l im 
economist(s) who come(s) up  with an original 
idea of visualizing a financial system that is 
workable on this earth. This would be possible 
only if we stop thinking about Islam as a 
Complete System of life and start working as 
normal human beings living on this planet 
meeting its requirements. When we say Islam 
offers a complete code of life from economy to 
every part of life then we stop  thinking 
creatively and just wait for Islamic sources to 
produce a system before us. Whereas in reality 
Islam has nothing to do with producing 
"systems" but  only with basic parameters. If we 
have assumed that Islam has its own banking 
and financial system that will challenge and 
replace the existing capitalist system then we 
are mistaken. If we can just  think differently 
that Islam has discussed only some basic 
parameters (those also very  few with limited 
scope and effect) then we can start thinking on 
'what' and 'how' to work on an alternative 
financial system. This is an idea the Muslim 
economists will never bother to ponder over, I 
am sure.
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CALL FOR PAPERS: IBN KHALDUN TODAY 
PRECURSOR OR ALTERNATIVE?
Ibn Khaldun Symposium May 29-31 2009 Istanbul
International Ibn Khaldun Society
Co-sponsored by Duke Islamic Studies Center (DISC), 
Duke University; Department of Malay Studies, 
National University of Singapore; Istanbul Foundation 
for Education and Research (ISAR)
The symposium is organized by the International Ibn 
Khaldun Society and cosponsored by Duke University 
and the National University of Singapore. This 
international symposium is the second on Ibn 
Khaldun. The first took place in Istanbul in 2006 
where the participants decided to establish the 
International Ibn Khaldun Society and to convene a 
meeting every three years in Istanbul. Selected papers 
from the first International Ibn Khaldun symposium 
have been published in Turkish (Turkish Journal of 
Islamic Studies,  2006) and English (Asian Journal of 
Social Science, 2008). The papers from the second 
International Symposium on Ibn Khaldun will also be 
published in English and Turkish.
SUBMISSION INFORMATION: Papers can be 
submitted through mail or e-mail. Submission of 
papers should include:1) Cover page (containing: title, 
participant’s name and institutional affiliation, 
participant’s e-mail address, telephone and fax 
numbers if available) 2) Abstract (300 words 
maximum) 3) Biographical statement of participant 
that describes research interests and recent 
publications (200 words maximum)
LANGUAGE OF THE SYMPOSIUM: Papers can be 
presented in Turkish, Arabic, and English. 
Simultaneous translation will be available. Selected 
papers of the symposium will be published.
TIMETABLE: November 30, 2008: Deadline for 
submission of abstracts; December 30, 2008: 
Confirmation of the accepted abstracts; March 30, 
2009: Deadline for submission of papers; April 15, 
2009: Deadline for confirmation of participation; May 
29-31, 2009: Symposium
SCHEDULE: The symposium will begin on Friday, 
May 29, 2009 and end on Sunday, May 31, 2009.
FUNDING: Accommodation will be provided for all 
participants for three days. A limited amount of 
funding, particularly for participants from abroad, is 
available for travel expenses. Please contact the 
Symposium Secretariat for further information.
ACTIVITIES: Visits to historical and cultural sites of 
Istanbul such as the Topkapı Palace, the Saint Sophia, 
and the Blue Mosque, and a Bosphorus tour will be 
arranged for participants.
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